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Article 7

ESSAY
THE POLITICS OF CLINICAL KNOWLEDGE
ANTHONY V. ALFIERI °
I. INTRODUCTION

Let me begin this essay by honoring the New York Law School Law
Review for generously providing a forum for clinical scholarship. By
welcoming clinical scholars to the public theater, the Review joins an
increasing number of journals committed to amplifying voices traditionally
unheard in the legal academy.' This is not the appropriate moment to
debate whether the silence of alternative voices is attributable to
exclusion2 or suppression.3 That serious debate, frequently joined by
critical scholars 4 far exceeds the scope of this essay.
Narrowly tailored, this essay is confined to the alternative voice of
clinical scholarship here sounded by nine respected teachers of clinical
education.5 At the outset, it is important to acknowledge that the task of
* Assistant Professor of Law and Director of Clinical Studies, Marquette University
Law School; A.B., Brown University, 1981; J.D., Columbia University School of Law, 1984.
I wish to thank Marie Ashe, Naomi Cahn, Clark Cunningham, William Grant, Larry
Grosberg, Madeleine Kurtz, Paula Lorant, Peter Margulies, Michael Perlin, Ann Shalleck,
Richard Sherwin, Graham Strong, Paul Tremblay, Louise Trubek, and Ellen Barker Grant
for their supportive critique, as well as Jennifer R. Woods and the Marquette University
Law School Library staff for their research assistance.
1. For recent compilations of clinical scholarship, see Symposium on Clinical Legal
Education, 36 CATH. U.L Rev. 337 (1987); Symposium: ClinicalLegal Education and the
Legal Profession, 29 CLeV. ST. L Rev. 345 (1980); Symposium, 19 N.M.L Rev. 1 (1989);
Symposium: ClinicalEducation, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 577 (1987).
2. On exclusion, see Bell & Delgado, MinorityLaw Professors'Lives: The Bell-Delgado
Survey, 24 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 349 (1989); Chused, The Hiring and Retention of
Minorities and Women on American Law School Faculties, 137 U. PA. L Rev. 537 (1988);
Rush, UnderstandingDiversity, 42 U. FLA. L Rev. 1 (1990).
3. On suppression, see Delgado, The ImperialScholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil
Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L Rev. 561 (1984); Fmeman, Challenging Law, Establishing
Differences: The Future of Feminist Legal Scholarshi]p, 42 U. FLA. L REv. 25 (1990).
4. See, eg., Matsuda,.AffirnativeAction andLegal Knowledge: PlantingSeeds in PlowedUp Ground, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 1 (1988).

5. See Barnhizer, The University Ideal and ClinicalLegal Education, 35 N.Y.L. ScH. L.
Rev. 87 (1990); Binder, Bergman & Price, The Nature of the CounselingProcess, 35 N.Y.L.
SCH. L Rev. 29 (1990); Hartwell, Moral Developmen4 Ethical Conduc=4 and Clinical
Education, 35 N.Y.L. ScH. L Rev. 131 (1990); McDiarmid, hat's Going on Down There
in the Basement. In-House Clinics Expand Their Beachhead, 35 N.Y.L. ScH. L. Rev. 239
(1990); Peters & Peters, Maybe That's Why IDo That: PsychologicalType Theory, the Myers-
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integrating the diverse works of this group into a unified body carries
certain attendant weaknesses. As with any truncated review, there is a
tendency to engage in reductive interpretation. Similarly, in this abridged
setting, there is an inclination to favor somewhat crude categorization.
Moreover, there is a compelled deference to sources cited in the original
texts.
Notwithstanding these imperfections, it is possible to organize the six
works at hand around a central unifying theme. The theme is politics. By
politics, I do not mean the institutional policies and practices governing
the hiring, promotion, and retention of clinical faculty. Rather, I employ
the term politics in the context of knowledge. The theme I wish to
explore concerns the politics of clinical knowledge.
Like any system of knowledge, clinical knowledge is comprised of
multiple categories of analysis. These categories may stand in tense
opposition or in mutual support.6 In each event, they shape our
understanding and vision of the world. Together, they define a way of
seeing.
In this essay, I endeavor to describe a vision-a way of
seeing-dominant in clinical education. The vision, I argue, is molded by
three categories of analysis: client identity, lawyer technique, and right
results. The categories are inexact, their application preliminary.
Nonetheless, I hope that the exploration, albeit unresolved, serves to
advance the clinical project.

II. CLINICAL KNOWLEDGE
Clinical knowledge is expressed in the teaching of lawyering.
Historically, our chosen means of expression has relied heavily on oral
traditions of story telling. Indeed, much of our teaching is bound up in
stories of lawyering. The stories told in clinical practice construct the
reality of the lawyer/client world. They give meaning to client identity,
fashion lawyer technique, and rationalize the results of litigation and
transactions.
In this way, the telling of lawyer stories is political. Partisan
metaphors, the stories reflect and reproduce a distinct way of seeing the
BrigS Type Indicator,and Learning Legal Interviewing, 35 N.Y.L SCH. L Rev. 169 (1990);
Weinstein, TeachingMediation in Law Schools: TrainingLawyers to be Wise, 35 N.Y.L SCH.
L Rev. 199 (1990).
6. See, &eg,Gifford, The Synthesis ofLegal CounselingandNegotiation Models: Preserving
Client-CenteredAdvocacy in the Negotiation Contet, 34 UCLA L REv. 811 (1987); Hyman,
TrialAdvocacy andMethods ofNegotiation: Can Good TrialAdvocates Be Wse Negotiators?,
34 UCLA L. Rev. 863 (1987); G. Strong, The Lawyer's Left Hand: Non-Analytical Thought
in the Practice of Law (1990) (unpublished manuscript).
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world. That world is lawyer defined, its values and truths imagined rather
than discovered. 7 Imposing lawyer defined values and truths on a world
where meaning is constructed, not found, privileges lawyer voice and story
telling. Because this interpretive privilege is usually exclusive, the
alternative voices and stories spoken by clients are often silenced.
Dismantling interpretive privilege requires interpretive contest. The
conceptual foundation for that contest is partially in place.8 Many are now
building on this foundation to propose alternative interpretive paradigms
more sensitive to the muted articulation of client voice and story.9 Theirs
is a collective work commonly rooted in the ground of daily lawyering. As
recent clinical studies of gender and race demonstrate, the thickness'0 of
the lawyering process demands contextual grounding."
III. CLENT IDENTITY
Client identity is a basic category of clinical knowledge. Frequently,
the meaning of client identity is cabined by enfeeblement. Enfeeblement

7. On the social construction of meaning, see P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY=" A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (1966).
8. See, eg., Alfieri, The Antinomies of Poverty Law and a Theory of Dialogic
Empowerment, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L & Soc. CHANGE 659 (1987-88); Handier, DependentPeople
the State, and the ModernlPostmodem Search for the Dialogic Community, 35 UCLA L RE.
999 (1988); Lopez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice:Seven Weeks in the Life of a Rebellious
Collaboration, 77 GEo. LJ. 1603 (1990); Menkel-Meadow, Exploring a Research Agenda of
the Feminization of the Legal Profession: Theories of Gender and Social Change, 14 LAw &
Soc. INQUIRY 289 (1989); Sarat, "... The Law Is All Over". Power,Resistance and the Legal
Consciousness of the Welfare Poor, 2 YAtE J.L. & HuMANrms 343 (1990); Simon, Visions
of Practicein Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L RE. 469 (1984); Tremblay, Toward a CommunityBased Ethicfor Legal Services Practice,37 UCLA L. REv. 1101 (1990); White, To Learn and
Teach.- Lessonsfrom Driefontein on Lawyering and Power, 1988 Wis. L. RE,. 699; Ellmann,
Lawyeringfor Justice in a FlawedDemocracy (Book Review), 90 CoLtrM. L. REV. 116 (1990).
9. See, eg, Alfieri, Speaking Out of Turn.. The Story of Josephine V, 4 GEo. J. LEGAL
ETHICS (1991) (forthcoming); White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit. Making
Space for Clients to Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L & Soc. CHANGE 535 (1987-88); C.
Cunningham, A New Way of Practicing Law- The Lawyer as Translator (1990) (unpublished
manuscript).
10. See C. GEERTZ, Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture, in THE
INTERFRErAnON OF CULTURES: SELECTED ESSAYS 3-30 (1973).

11. See, ag, Cahn, A PreliminaryFeminist Critique of Legal Ethics, 4 Gao. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 601 (1990); Eyster, Anasis of Sexism in Legal Practice:A ClinicalApproach, 38 .
LEGAL EDUC. 183 (1988); Eyster, IntegratingNon-SexistlRacist Perspectives into Traditional
Course and Clinical Settings, 14 S. ILL. U.LJ. 471 (1990); Goldfarb, The Theory-Practice
Spirak Insights from Feminism and Clinical Education, 75 MINN. L. Ray. (1991)
(forthcoming); Scarnecchia, Gender& RaceBiasAgainstLawyers:A ClassroomResponse, 23
U. MICH. 1. REF. 319 (1990); A- Shalleck, Clinical Supervision in Context: From a Case
to a Vision (1990) (unpublished manuscript).
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is signified by the image of client helplessness. There is growing suspicion
that this socially constructed image is false.12 From this stance of
suspicion, the client is not infirm but enfeebled. The enfeebled client
suffers infirmities of helplessness imputed by lawyer misconstruction of the
client world.
Misconstruction of client identity is buttressed by vague allusion to a
natural client character. On this account, helplessness is considered an13
immutable feature of an inherent client nature. When this essentialist
allusion encounters contradictory evidence of client character, especially
character independent and activist in nature, there is resort to an
instrumentalist narrative. Intended to rescue the unstable construction of
client identity, this narrative posits client helplessness as a necessary,
rather than a natural construct. Support for this functional predicate is
found in the logic of client infirmity as a practical condition of lawyering.
Both Don and Martha Peters and Janet Weinstein seek to remedy
lawyer misconstruction of client identity by experimenting with alternative
ways of seeing. In Learning Legal Interviewing,4 the Peters trace
misconstruction to the failure of interviewing theory to satisfy the main
objectives of rapport building and information gathering. They attribute
that failure to the distortions of lawyer routinization and dominance.16
Locating their efforts in a general civil practice clinic devoted
primarily to matrimonial litigation, 17 the Peters deploy psychological type
theory, specifically the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), as a means
of clarifying clinical vision.' 8 The pedagogic goals of the MBTI are
twofold: first, to encourage collaborative working skills; and second, to
improve interviewing and negotiating skills. These goals were tested
during a two-year period spanning three semesters. 9

12. See, ag, Matsuda,Looking to the Bottom: CriticalLegal Studies andReparations,22
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L RaV. 323 (1987); Matsuda, Mien the First Quail Calls: Multiple
Consciousness as JurisprudentialMethod, 11 WOMEN'S RTs. L REP. 7 (1989).
13. For discussions of essentialism, see E. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS
OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIT THouGHT (1988); Cornell, The Doubly-Prized World- Myth, Allegory
and the Feminine,75 CoRNELL I Rav. 644 (1990); Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist
Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990); Williams, Feminism's Search for the Feminine:
Essentialism, Utopianism and Community, 75 CORNELL L. Ray. 700 (1990).
14. Peters & Peters, supra note 5.
15. The Peters cite, inter alia, the work of Gary Bellow, Bea Moulton, David Binder,
and Susan Price in developing effective interviewing models. Id. at 169 n.1.
16. Id at 169.
17. The Virgil Hawkins Civil Clinic at the University of Florida College of Law
provided the setting for studying the interview process. Id at 170.
18. The MBTI is disseminated to students on a voluntary basis early in the clinical
semester. Id. at 174.
19. Id.at 175.
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For the Peters, application of psychological type theory to clinical
pedagogy is warranted by the crucial importance of perception and
judgment in client-centered interviewing. Perception is denoted in terms
of information acquisition. Judgment is defined in terms of decision
making.20
In a brief summary of psychological type theory, the Peters explain
that the MBTI establishes four bi-polar indexes measuring perception and
judgment. The indexes register interpretive and decision-making
preferences. These categorical preferences are gauged by four scales
encompassing
Sensing-Intuition,
Thinking-Feeling,
ExtraversionIntroversion, and Judging-Perceiving. The scales indicate the direction and
strength of preferences.2,
To determine the salience of psychological preference types to the
interviewing process, the Peters focus on the spheres of question
formulation and listening responses. This focus guided a pilot analysis of
twenty-three student-conducted client interviews regarding marriage
dissolution proceedings. The transcribed results of those interviews
supplied the data for preliminary speculations concerning behavioral
tendencies linked to type-based preferences.3
Despite the concededly small size of this data base and the additional
methodological limitations of the pilot study, the Peters contend that
potential type-related behavioral tendencies are germane to question
formulation and active listening. Accordingly, they identify particular typerelated preferences (e.g., extraversion, sensing, feeling) and describe how
such preferences may engender tendencies contributing to the
reformulation of questions and responses. These tendencies, they argue,
may be fostered in both the learning and experiential stages of the clinical
process.23
Because of the behavioral tendencies common to the questioning and
listening components of student-conducted client interviewing, the Peters
propose integration of the MBTI typology into the clinical curriculum.
They defend integration on the basis of efficacy and self-awareness.
Moreover, they claim that the clinical process is open to reconstructive
dialogue pertaining to type-related behavioral tendencies, implying the
potential for behavior modification through clinical pedagogy.Y
The theme of clinical reconstruction is enlarged by Janet Weinstein.

20. Id at 175-76.
21. Id at 175-78.
22. Id at 179-84.
23. Id at 182-95.
24. Id at 183-84, 195-98. Full extension of the Peters' behavioral model to the
lawyering context is questionable. See Simon, Homo Psychologicus: Notes on a New Legal
Formalism, 32 STAN. L RaV. 487 (1980).
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In Training Lawyers to be Wise, Weinstein reports on her experience
devising and supervising a clinical mediation program.25 The espoused
purpose of the program is the achievement of lawyer wisdom and client
empowerment2 6 The notion of lawyer wisdom embodies an aspirational
vision of the lawyer as a wise person.27 The concept of client
empowerment embraces the transference of lawyer power and the
reconfiguration of the lawyer/client relation. To Weinstein, the wise
lawyer is distinguished by her ability "to assist others in an empowering

.way.,,'s

Recognizing that the cultivation of lawyering wisdom demands an
alternative clinical paradigm, Weinstein eschews traditional rule-based
adversarial techniques of conflict resolution in favor of a threedimensional problem-solving orientation. That orientation endorses a
9
party-centered approach to problem solving.2
Weinstein derives the vision of party-centered problem solving from
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) models. The models stress the
integration of creative and cooperative lawyering skills. In designing a
skills training regimen, Weinstein declines to adopt a single ADR model.
Instead, she puts forward a variety of models encouraging
students to
3
select frameworks appropriate to specific situations. 0
To facilitate the suitable casting of ADR-based mediation schemes,
Weinstein emphasizes intensive skills training. The training encompasses
communication, listening, negotiation, empowerment, and self-awareness.
While these skills are considered
interdependent, listening is cited as the
31
key to mediation training.
From the embarking point of true listening, Weinstein marshalls a

25. Weinstein, supra note 5, at 199.
26. Id This overarching purpose represents the distillation of five constituent goals,
including: (A) Creating a model which would draw forth the students' wisdom and creativity;,
(B) Changing the lawyer's philosophical map; (C) Increasing lawyering skills; (D)Achieving
clinical goals of increased self-knowledge and understanding of the learning process; and
(E) Remaining open and actively participating in the learning process. M,.at 201-04.
27. The wise person is denominated as "one who can listen to others and exercise
professional judgment, knowledge, emotions, and concern in a nonpaternalistic way." Id. at
201.
28. Id. at 199.
29. Id at 200. Weinstein cites Binder and Price's client-centered approach to
interviewing and counseling in support of her proposed party-centered approach. See D.
BINDER & S. PRcE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSEUNG: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH
(1977).
30. Weinstein, supra note 5,at 204-05. By installing a pedagogical structure demanding
the creative adaptation of ADR models and techniques, Weinstein engenders studentdirected learning and decision making.
31. Id. at 203-04, 205-06.
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holistic approach to problem solving. The approach draws on the literature
of psychology and theater 32 to comprehend the dynamics of conflict.33
Culling different forms of verbal and nonverbal communication from this
literature, Weinstein contends, illuminates the nature of conflict and the
variability of human behavior in mediation settings.
For Weinstein, the convergence of communication skills, flexible
technique, and interdisciplinary training gives rise to "new ways of
communicating with others. '35 Animated by the disparate styles and talents
of individual students, these new methods of interaction emphasize the
context over the form of mediation. This emphasis centers clinical
36
pedagogy on the "interplay between understanding and competence."
The contextual fusion of understanding and competence enables
Weinstein to formulate a clinical curriculum governed by self-directed
learning. To ensure that the learning project is open and continuous, the
curriculum highlights the multi-dimensionality of human interaction
occurring on intellectual, emotional, spiritual, and physical levels. This
density underscores the importance of investigating alternative
interpretations of client/party identity revealed during interaction.37
Weinstein introduced her mediation program with listening,
observation, and negotiation exercises. Gradually, these exercises evolved
into role plays interweaving listening, empathy, experience, and reflection.
Weinstein mentions the palpable increase in student self-awareness and
the improvement in lawyering skills obtained through role playing. This
overall enhancement suggests to her some correlation between the
38
internalization of mediation training and the growth of lawyering ability.
When students reached the stage of conducting actual mediations,
Weinstein noted a marked improvement in the quality of student listening.
Similar progress was observed regarding the students' ability to shift
power to the parties participating in the mediation. Overcoming initial
and sometimes persistent party and39 student resistance to the transference
of power hinged on three factors.
The first of these interrelated factors involved trust in the mediation

32. This literature prompted a class devoted to "creative dramatics" where both
students and teacher performed a "moving sculpture" signifying the stages of mediation. Id.
at 206, 214.
33. In locating the dynamics of a dispute, Weinstein examines how people feel, react,
and relate to each other. Id at 216.
34. I at 206-07.
35. Id at 207.
36. Id at 208.
37. Id at 207-08.
38. Id at 209-10, 211-12, 218-26.
39. I at 221, 222-23.
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process itself. Garnered from the experience of observing and practicing
mediation, this proceduralist trust developed quickly. Curiously, trust in
self and in the parties proceeded more slowly. 40
A second factor implicated the students' ability to maintain conditions
of party respect and safety during the mediation. According to Weinstein,
respect and safety must be displayed in a manner sufficient to establish
party perception of student neutrality, concern, and competence. Without
this shared perception and an atmosphere of cooperation, the mediation
process may deteriorate into chaos, acrimony, or worse, dominance. 4'
A third factor concerned the students' ability to exhibit openness and
receptivity. Adopting this posture entailed the willingness to engage in
self-disclosing and other-affirming behavior. Disclosure required honesty
and at times confrontation. Affirmation enlisted listening and respect.42
The materialization of these empowerment practices and the resulting
reconfiguration of client/party identity in the mediation context
demonstrates the value of Weinstein's alternative clinical paradigm.
Although experimental, the paradigm evinces the potential vitality of an
empowerment-based pedagogy and training.4 3 That critical vitality is
frequently stifled by lawyer technique, particularly when technique
pretends to be neutral.
IV. LAWYER TECHNIQUE

Lawyer technique encompasses a broad range of litigation and
transactional skills. The interpretive privileging of lawyer technique is
obscured by the claim of neutrality. This claim infects the varied elements
of clinical skills (e.g., interviewing and counseling). Glossed by the patina
of neutrality, lawyering appears as an amalgam of technical skills acquired
through objective pedagogy and applied in the value-free representation
of largely fungible clients. Those technical skills may be demonstrated in

40. Id. at 223-25.

41. Id. at 224-25.
42. Id at 225-26.
43. Building on the work of Carl Rogers, Weinstein grounds her person-centered
approach on the premise that the "client knows what he or she needs." Id. at 227 (emphasis
added) (citing C. RoGEms, ON BECOMING A PERSON (1961)). See also C. ROGERS, FREEDOM
TO LEARN (1979).

Weinstein's overall approach must be measured against recent criticisms of the ADR
movement. See, ag, Delgado, Dunn, Brown, Lee & Hubbert, Fairness and Formality:
Minimizing the Risk of Prejudicein Alternative DisputeResolution, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1359;
Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal DisputeResolution
on Women, 7 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 57 (1984); Silbey & Sarat, DisputeProcessingin Law and
Legal Scholarship:From Institutional Critique to the Reconstruction of the JuridicalSubject,
66 DEN. U.L Rsv. 437 (1989).
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role, reproduced in simulation, and verified in action.
The claim of neutral technique is safeguarded by oblique analogy to
the scientific method. 44 Fairly extended, the analogue gives rise to the
mystification of clinical practice as science. 45 The image of the clinician
as lawyer-scientist is intuitively appealing. Consistent with the scientific
method, the clinician invents a battery of simulated and experiential
exercises. Gathering material data from these tests, she reasons inductively
seeking to infer broad principles of lawyering. Isolating the natural state
of the client world, she applies these principles and discovers that they
necessarily yield the right result.
The notion of a generalizable technique susceptible to universal
application overlooks diverse configurations of client class, gender, and
race. Because these configurations represent alternative constructions of
client identity and world, their omission silences whole communities of
voice and story. Silencing permits the category of client enfeeblement to
survive intact. Further, it allows lawyer/client hierarchy to reproduce itself
unchecked.
The work of David Binder, Paul Bergman, and Susan Price
demonstrates the silencing consequences of interpretive omission. In the
past, the clinical project has gained substantial force from the energy and
insight of these scholars." For example, Binder and Price's Legal
Interviewing and Counseling,47 though not unscathed by criticism,48 is
considered an essential text by many and enjoys wide acceptance
throughout the clinical community.49 In light of that formidable reputation,
the publication of Lawyers as Counselors:A Client-CenteredApproach,50
after thirteen years of cogitation, is a moment of some gravity.

44. To understand the meretricious force of this neutrality claim, it is instructive to
look to the history of science. See generally C. GILLSPIE, THE EDGE OF OBicnvrry: AN
ESSAY INTHE HisroRY OF SCIENTIFIC IDEAS (1960); T. KUHN, THE STRuCruRE OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970); S. MASON, A HISrORY OF THE SCIENCES (1962).
45. For discussions of epistemological mystification and scientific rationality, compare
Williams, CriticalLegal Studies: The Death of Transcendence and the Rise of the New
Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 429 (1987) (Critical Legal Studies) with Horwitz, Law and
Economics: Science or Politics?,8 HOFSrRA L REV. 905 (1980) (Law and Economics).
46. See, eg., D. BINDER & P. BERGMAN, FAcr INVESTIGATION: FROM HYPoTHESIs TO
PROOF (1984); D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 29.
47. D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 29.
48. See, eg, Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling Reappraisal and 1Refinemen4 32
ARIz. L REv. 501 (1990); Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REv. 717 (1987).
49. In 1989 and 1990, the West Publishing Co. estimated adoption of Binder and
Price's Legal Inteniewing and Counselingby over 100 law schools and colleges in the United
States (telephone interview with Owen Shaffer, Associate Manager Law School Department,
West Publishing Co. (Nov. 8, 1990)). See D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 29.
50. Binder, Bergman & Price, supra note 5, at 29.
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Unfortunately, Lawyers as Counselors is marred by a deep-seated
reluctance to address the interpretive privileging of client identity and to
redress the claim of neutral technique. Although this reluctance is
embroidered by client-centered rhetoric and the denunciation of
mechanical technique, it is clearly pronounced. Divulged in stories of
lawyering, it embodies an interpretive stance dominant in clinical practice.
by the enlightened rhetoric of empathy,
That stance cannot be saved
5
diversity, and partnership. '
With respect to client identity, Binder, Bergman, and Price present
a purified world uncontaminated by class, gender, and race, and moreover,
undisturbed by the hierarchical configurations which accompany them.
This is not to suggest that there is no mention of these categories in their
stories of lawyering. Whatever mention is made, however, is tangential to
the lawyering process.
The insignificance of class, gender, and race hierarchies is revealed
in story. Mr. Rodale, for example, is counseled regarding the termination
of Ms. Rex. Ms. Biggs is counseled on partnership banking options. Snider
is negotiating a shopping center lease with a female landlord. A client is
negotiating to purchase knives from a Chinese manufacturer. Ms. Gilliger
a marital
is planning to dismiss an employee. Mrs. Benizi is contemplating
52
settlement offer. Gomez is negotiating a commercial lease.
In each story, class, gender, and race appear but do not enter into
Binder, Bergman, and Price's analysis of lawyering. Barred from
meaningful analysis, their appearance is rendered perfunctory, a nod to
liberal convention. Without more, we are left to infer that these
categories are irrelevant to the lawyering process. If not irrelevant, then
that they are immaterial to the "typical"
we may speculate alternatively
53
lawyer/client relation.
This alternative inference finds support in Binder, Bergman, and
Price's telling of "typical" lawyer/client stories. Kimmel, for instance, is
weighing a wrongful termination settlement offer. Martino is negotiating
a lease with SafeBet Markets. Gower is negotiating a contract extension
with the Smeltics. Lynn is suing to terminate a corporate lease and
recover rent arrears. Bilt is negotiating to buy land for a housing tract.
Bob is negotiating a deal with Metal Beams. Jim is managing business
personnel. Jan and Doug are seeking to appoint guardians for their
children.5 4
Once again, in these stories of lawyering, class, gender, and race have

51.
52.
53.
54.

Id
I- at 30-31, 33, 50, 54-57, 76-78, 84.
Id. at 64.
Id at 34-35, 35-38, 43-44, 49, 58-59, 60-61, 63, 65, 67, 73-75, 80-86.
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no place. They play no part in the client's "life situation."55 Similarly, they
in no way inform the client's "values and preferences."'56 For Binder,
Bergman, and Price, these categories are inapposite even when client
decision making may be distorted by their misconstruction.
A case in point is their example of the defendant client in a burglary
prosecution who declines to call his sister to testify as an alibi witness
because, he asserts, testifying will cause her "undue stress."57 His lawyer,
in contrast, "believe[s] the sister will make an excellent witness." 5 8 Having
erected this conflict, Binder, Bergman, and Price offer several equally
unsatisfactory approaches to resolution.
The first approach relies on "ends-means" reasoning. This method of
reasoning is flawed by indeterminacy. As Binder, Bergman, and Price
point out, the client's decision to call the sister may be construed as a
59
matter of both ends and means depending on stated objectives.
The second approach hinges on "prior waiver." This approach rests
on informed client judgment regarding the nature and extent of lawyer
consultation desired prior to decision making. Binder, Bergman, and Price
comment that the validity of a "waiver" agreement requires not only
informed judgment, but also initial and ongoing opportunities to reassess
that judgment. They caution that the judgment of "inexperienced" and
"unsophisticated" clients may undermine the validity of a "waiver"
agreement. 0
To avoid the nettlesome calculations of "ends-means" and "prior
waiver" approaches, Binder, Bergman, and Price posit a third approach.
This approach is tied to a "substantial impact standard." Under the
standard, the lawyer "should give a client an opportunity to make a
decision whenever [the] lawyer, using 'such skill, prudence, and diligence
as other members of the profession commonly possess and exercise,'
knows or should know that a pending decision is likely to have a
substantial legal or nonlegal impact on a client."6'

Applied to the instant burglary prosecution context, the substantial
impact standard may authorize lawyer override of the defendant client's
decision to proceed at trial without the benefit of his sister's alibi
testimony. Likewise, application of the "ends-means" and "prior waiver"
tests may produce the same result. This commonality of result is traceable
to the interpretive paradigm employed by Binder, Bergman, and Price.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id at 36 n.24.
at 37 n.26.
Id. at 40-41 (emphasis added).
I at 41.

I

59. Id
60. Id
61. I

at 41-42 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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Theirs is a paradigm of lawyer power where client decision making is
continually subject to review and override.
This is the paradoxical import of Binder, Bergman, and Price's
analysis. Paradoxical because their overarching purpose is to constrain the
traditionally broad ambit of sanctioned lawyer intervention in decision
making precisely in order to safeguard client autonomy. That purpose is
ill-served by omitting serious consideration of the class, gender, and race
components of client/party identity and decision making.
Exploring these components, notably the category of gender, in the
context of the above burglary prosecution may enable the defendant client
himself to withdraw objection to his sister's testimony. 62 But that decision
may be-reached only if the lawyer introduces the interpretive category of
gender into the counseling dialogue. 3 Gender is especially germane
because it is the client's sister, not brother, who allegedly would suffer
"undue stress." This relevance is underscored by the degrading historical
equation of gender and weakness in public spheres of discourse.
To be sure, gender misconstruction may not fully explain the client's
objection to his sister's testimony. Additional factors may be responsible,
such as the sister's possibly undisclosed history of mental disability or
psychological distress. Yet, gender may provide a partial explanation. To
the extent that an interpretive category may expose the underpinnings and
facilitate the salutary revision of client decision making, it is deserving of
inclusion in counseling dialogue.
Truncated by omission, Binder, Bergman, and Price's theory of
lawyer/client dialogue is pressed
to rely on the shibboleths of
"professional skills and crafts." 64 Sometimes, they admit, these skills must
be supplemented by "professional experience, awareness of human6S
behavior, and familiarity with the context in which a problem arises."
But, it seems, in no event should this battery of skills be augmented by
the interpretive categories of class, gender, and race."
Lacking these fundamental categories of analysis, how are lawyers to
understand the "individual makeup of each client?" How are we to learn
"who she 'really' is?" How are we to establish a "counseling dialogue?"
How are we to "help clients resolve problems?" How are we to assign
"maximum value" to client decision making? Finally, how is a client to

62. See Margulies, 'Who Are You to Tell Me That?": Attorney-Client Deliberation
RegardingNonlegal Issues and the Interests of Nonclients, 68 N.C.L REv. 213 (1990).
63. See Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature
of Legal Reasoning, 64 Nora DAmp. L.REv. 886 (1989).
64. Binder, Bergman & Price, supra note 5, at 44, 45.
65. Id. at 48.
66. Id,
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"hear" what we have to say and "see" what we have to show? 67
Binder, Bergman, and Price's peculiar answer is to call for the
"appearance of neutrality."6 Professing neutrality in a situation of
interpretive privilege rings false. The manipulation 9 and marginalization7
privilege run counter to lawyer adoption of a
which attend interpretive
"neutral stance."71 Clients who perceive the falsity of this stance, however,
appear to Binder, Bergman, and Price as "overly deferential to authority
figures." 72 This appearance masks client recognition of lawyer power. In
this sense, deference manifests a client survival strategy.
Binder, Bergman, and Price seem oblivious to the possibility that
clients may be actively constructing a facade to fit the image of
helplessness privileged by dominant interpretive paradigms. Instead of selfsuspicion, they decry this group of clients as inclined "by nature [to] defer
to experts and authority figures." 73 This whitewashing of client identity
and lawyer technique invites skepticism. If key interpretive categories can
find no place in the lawyering contexts depicted by Binder, Bergman, and
Price, then the reality underlying that depiction must be questioned.
As Binder, Bergman, and Price show, that reality is informed by
lawyer situated interpretation. From this interpretive vantage point, the
lawyer subject-reproduces a reality where his class, his gender, his race,
and his world are baseline constructions. Deviations from this privileged
baseline are not considered to be legitimate alternative constructions of
a rich multi-layered reality. Nor are they regarded as strategies adopted
to maneuver inside and outside an oppressive reality. On the contrary,
they are judged to be symbolic of an "overly deferential" attitude toward
authority figures, an attitude preventing meaningful client participation in
the lawyering process.
Approving this privileged interpretive framework, David Barnhizer
praises clinicians for contributing to the reformulation of American legal
education. 74 In The University Ideal, he links this contribution to the
67. Id at 51 (citation omitted), 51 n.54, 48, 49, 54, 57.
68. IdL at 64.
69. On client autonomy and lawyer manipulation, see Ellmann, supra note 48; Ellmann,
Manipulationby Client and Contet A Response to ProfessorMorris, 34 UCLA L REv.1003

(1987).
70. On client marginalization, see White, Subordination,Rhetorical Survival Skills and
Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearingof Mrs. G., 38 BuFFALO L.REv. 1 (1990).
71. Binder, Bergman & Price, supra note 5, at 75.
72. Id at 68 n.103.
73. Id at 64 (emphasis added). In support of this overbroad proposition, Binder,
Bergman, and Price cite David Riesman's forty-year-old sociological study. It is their sole
citation. See D. RiESMAN, THE LONELY CRowD -A STUDY OF THE CHANGING AMERICAN
CHARACER (1950).

74. Barnhizer, supra note 5, at 88.
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curricular introduction of social justice, legal skills, and professional
responsibility.75 For Barnhizer, these subjects spurred a curricular
revolution creating an alternative legal reality.76
Barnhizer attributes the recasting of legal reality to the work of an
historically assembled group of public interest advocates cum clinicians. 77
While conceding that these first-wave clinicians were guided by inchoate
and fragmented visions of social justice, he identifies common bonds
chiefly involving the development of practical skills, professional values,
conceptios of justice, and new forms of knowledge in the service of the
disadvantaged.78 Barnhizer perceives this multifaceted development as a
challenge to the "extreme formalization and professed neutrality of
traditional legal education." 79
Ascribing the motive of social engineering to this clinical cadre,
Barnhizer portrays a "crudely coherent critical mass" inspired by an
elementary "liberal vision of a just society." 80 Discounting these
deficiencies, Barnhizer turns to what he considers to be a more crucial
question: "whether the clinical movement undermines or advances the
ideal of the university." 81
By way of answer, Barnhizer admonishes us to search the American
university ideal, specifically the university law school. He errantly begins
this search by positing a dichotomy separating the academic university
from professional instruction.8 This dichotomy rests on the claim that
these two educational forums maintain "distinctly different, often
incompatible, oriertations." s
Barnhizer's asserted incompatibility between university and law school
teachings leads him to accuse clinical faculty of "latent antiintellectualism." This charge stems from his dim appraisal of clinical
theory and practice. Beyond a "few exceptions," Barnhizer contends
clinicians have "done little" to probe the content or implications of their

75. Barnhizer observes: "Clinical faculty built new programs and courses, forced politics
and other disciplines into the law schools, and experimented with new subject matters,
learning environments, teaching methodologies, and educational goals." Id.

76.
77.
78.
79.

1d
Idat 89.
Id.
Id

80. Id at 90.
81. Id at 91.
82. Barahizer adopts the peculiar usage "unfused dichotomy" to describe this
separation. Id at 92.
83. Id
84. Id at 94.
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own cardinal themes."'
Because of this intellectual deficit, Barnhizer denounces clinicians for
advancing "nothing more than an inchoate claim to participation" in
university governance. At the same time, he embraces clinical theory and
practice as "urgently needed" by and consonant with the university ideal.
Thus, he exhorts clinicians to infuse their work with appropriate
"intellectual spirit." 7
To prod the clinical spirit, Barnhizer puts forward a brief history of
the university, pointedly noting its partisan interests and functional
rhetoric. He mistakes the rhetoric of "dispassionate inquiry," however, as
an unembellished description of the "research and knowledge acquisition
functions" of the university." Compounding this error, he obliges
clinicians to "honor" the "truth" unearthed by "dispassionate inquiry." 89
The folly of this obligation is part of the fantasm of neutral
technique. Barnhizer's endorsement of neutral methodology is confounded
by his rebuff of Langdellian "neutral scientific rationalism" and by his
lament that the clinical "preoccupation" with technique diminishes and
sometimes precludes the pursuit of "practical justice and knowledge." 9
This "fixation," he remarks, undermines the achievement of "practical
conceptions of social justice."9 '
For Barnhizer, the pursuit of "practical justice and knowledge"
constitutes the primary mission of the clinical project. That mission
incorporates "intermediate or macro-levels" of practical knowledge and
the "general truths" of social justice.92 Fulfillment of the mission of doing
justice, Barnhizer concludes, requires political vision and principled
inquiry 3
Notwithstanding Barnhizer's protests, there is no shortage of political
vision in clinical education. There are, in fact, the dominant visions of
client infirmity, neutral technique, and right results. Moreover, there is the
reigning politics of interpretive privilege exercised to enfeeble clients and
cloak value-laden technique. Barnhizer's failure to confront these
determinants of clinical practice condemns his effort to relocate the
clinical project.

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

I
Id.
I
Id. at
Id.
Id at
Id. at
Id at
I at

97.
99, 121.
121, 122.
103, 104.
105, 107, 111, 128.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAWREVIEW

[VCol. 35

V. PGHT RESULTS
In clinical practice, right results flow automatically from the
application of lawyer technique. Right results do not refer to the actual
results of litigation or transactions. Rightness instead refers to the selfexecuting operation of lawyer technique.
The autonomous quality of lawyer technique fosters the pretense of
clinical neutrality and veils the practice of client enfeeblement. Exposure
of the enfeebling consequences of technique depends on the critical
reassessment of right results. 94 The starting point of this reassessment is
the original position of the client. By original position, I do not mean a
catalogue of material conditions, but rather the meaning of client identity
constructed by the lawyer at the commencement of the lawyer/client
relation.
Dominant clinical paradigms often equate client identity with
adjoining material circumstances. Yet, there is no clear correlation
between the character of client identity and the nature of material
surroundings. The empirical documentation of client circumstances is
profoundly different from the normative construction of client identity.
Vulnerable to the demeaning constructions of the lawyer subject, it is not
surprising that client identity is construed in terms of character traits (e.g.,
dependence, passivity, and helplessness) frequently associated with settings
inhabited by the historically subordinated: women, people of color, and
the impoverished. 95
The end point of the reassessment of tight results is the final position
of the client at the close of the lawyering process. This reassessment
ventures to discern changes in the capacity for individual or collective
advocacy independent of lawyer intervention. Enfeebled by lawyer
technique, client identity may divulge an incapacity for self-directed
advocacy. Client incapacity, however, represents a survival strategy
invented to withstand the lawyering process.
When the strategic inception of client incapacity goes unrecognized
in the threshold assessment of identity, the concluding assessment of right
results is confined to the measurement of visible changes in material
circumstances. This measurement affords only a partial assessment.
Nevertheless, it is the conventional yardstick used to gauge the efficacy
of clinical practice. 96
94. For discussions of critical reassessment, see Alfieri, supra note 8; Cunningham,
Legal Storytelling:A Tale of Two Clients: ThinkingAbout Law as Language,87 MIcH. L. RV.
2459 (1989); White, supra note 70.
95. A recent survey compiled by Professor Carolyn Kubitschek indicates that clinical
practice is mainly concentrated in civil and criminal law fields of indigent representation. See
C. Kubitschek, Clinicians' Substantive Specialties (Dec. 1988) (unpublished survey).
96. Plainly, I am excluding consideration of student learning in applying this yardstick.
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The incomplete nature of this prevailing assessment is masked by the
illusion of client incapacity. Tolerating this deceit rationalizes the practice
of client enfeeblement. Dominant clinical paradigms are built on this selfserving deception. Because of such reliance, the review and
reconfiguration of client identity is neglected as an element of clinical
practice. Hence, client incapacity endures as a lawyer-manufactured
constant. That incapacity is unmitigated by the remedial effects of
litigation and transactions. The unseen feature of these applauded
outcomes betrays the demeaning consequences of lawyering. At times,
these consequences may outweigh the advantages derived from lawyerwon material benefits.
At bottom, there is nothing natural or necessa'y about client
incapacity. Nor is there anything neutral about the enfeebling
consequences of lawyer technique. Nor is there anything right about
particular results. But, these specters pervade clinical practice. Their
phantom presence haunts even the most careful scholarship privileging
dominant interpretations and excluding alternative constructs.
Insulated by interpretive privilege, clinical scholars have been slow to
rally a defensible account of the enfeebling consequences of clinical
practice. In What's Going on Down There in the Basement: In-House
ClinicsExpand Their Beachhead,97 for example, Marjorie McDiarmid offers
a comprehensive treatment of the in-house live-client clinical paradigm
without broaching the subject of enfeeblement and its cohort neutral
technique. While that oversight compromises her theoretical defense of
the clinical project in opposition to ancient Langdellian orthodoxy, it does
not diminish the importance of her achievement.
McDiarmid begins by revisiting the long-standing debate launched by
Jerome Frank's injunction, Why Not a ClinicalLawyer-School? Staking
her alliance with Frank against Langdell, she proposes to "chart the
progress" of clinical education." The means of marking such progress is
a carefully conceived and wide ranging study commenced in 1987.100
Because of its sweep and detail, the significance of the study is great.
Concentrating on the current status of live-client in-house clinics, the
study reviews pedagogical methods, learning activities, faculty size and
support, student/faculty ratios, and student demand. Moreover, the study
reports on the status, qualifications, and workload of clinicians compared

97. McDiarmid, supra note 5, at 239.
98. See Frank, Why Not a ClinicalLawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L RLay. 907, 907-08

(1933).
99. McDiarmid, supra note 5, at 240.
100. Relevant data was gathered by the Data Collection Sub-Committee of the
Association of American Law Schools' Section on Clinical Legal Education, Committee on
the Future of the In-House Clinic. Id- at 240-43.
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to nonclinical faculty. This comparative assessment is undertaken against
the backdrop of section 405(e) of the American Bar Association Standards
for the Approval of Law Schools.'' Further, the study considers the
availability, costs, and resources of the live-client in-house clinic.l
Committed to the representation of real clients, McDiarmid's clinical
paradigm furnishes a diverse instructional program combining both
classroom teaching and simulation exercises to instill lawyering and
analytical skills, as well as professional and community responsibility.
Annual enrollment on average numbers 24.2 students, each devoting
approximately one hour more per week per credit than nonclinical
students. These numbers produce a faculty/student ratio of 1:8.41, a
constant figure over a ten-year span.103
The stability of McDiarmid's paradigm belies the precarious
institutional standing of clinicians. Battered by inadequate resources and
insufficient faculty support, many clinicians are consigned to the status of
a second order caste, despite meeting comparable hiring and promotion
criteria. Attendant to this relegation is a more burdensome teaching load.
The effect of Standard 405(e) in curing these disparities seems at best
ambiguous. 1' 4
In an effort to bolster the live-client in-house clinical paradigm
against continuing assaults on status and cost accounting,'01 McDiarmid
advances a three-pronged defense. The defense binds together claims of
pedagogical effectiveness, epistemological integrity, and content
appropriateness to accent the value of role identification.1°6
While not incontrovertible, these claims do not ignite serious quarrel.
Many clinicians abide by them because of their demonstrated pedagogical
and epistemological substance. The unreserved trumpeting of role
identification, however, is troubling. Without limitation, role identification
is antithetical to the promotion of pedagogical and epistemological
integrity in clinical practice.
Clinical integrity turns on the ability and willingness to challenge
prevailing pedagogical and epistemological regimes. By mounting such
challenges, clinicians discover the privileged underpinnings of established

101. See ABA STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS AND INTERPRgrATIONS
Standard 405(e) (1988).
102. McDiarmid, supra note 5, at 280-92.
103. Id at 250-56.
104. Id at 274-80.
105. Although clinical curricular expenditures as a percentage of overall law school
budgets declined from 1977-1978 to 1987-1988, the disparity between clinical and nonclinical
curricular costs holds true to a diminished extent. The relative cost disparity is attributable
to low student-faculty ratios. Id at 254-56, 281-86.
106. Id at 286-92.
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practices. That discovery affords a means of revising conventional roles,
techniques, and results. The attempt to revise the clinical project is
exemplified here by Steven Hartwell's Moral Developmen4 Ethical
Conduc4 and ClinicalEducation.1 7 In this work, Hartwell draws directly
from the clinical setting to frame an investigation into the teaching and
practice of ethics.'08 Beginning with an explication of Lawrence Kohlberg's
five-stage theory of moral development, he struggles to understand and
rectify the ethically problematic behavior demonstrated initially by an
individual student and subsequently by a group of twenty-four students.' 09
These wrong results provide the starting point for Hartwell's revisionist
project.
To his credit, Hartwell does not engage in the speculative exercise of
casually engrafting Kohlberg's categories of analysis onto a clinical
backdrop. Rather, he proceeds gingerly, conceding the tentative nature of
his hypotheses. These provisional hypotheses follow from his observation
that students engaging in moral reasoning are acutely vulnerable to the
persuasion of authority figures."10 Commenting on this vulnerability,
Hartwell remarks: "when confronted by such perceived authority
represented by their clinic supervisor, [students] shift responsibility for the
consequences of their actions to the authority.""'
Distressed by student dependence on and deference to the ethical
commands of perceived authority figures in the clinical context, Hartwell
resolves to experiment with alternative pedagogical methods to spur moral
development. That resolution is fundamental to the refashioning of
dominant clinical practices. In its absence, students maintain an

107. Hartwell, supra note 5.
108. Id, at 131-33.
109. The challenged group behavior occurred during an interviewing and counseling
exercise regarding a party to a small claims court rent dispute. To test individual stages of
student moral development, Hartwell "told each student to advise the client to lie under
oath that she had paid the rent." Twenty-three students acquiesced, though not without
widespread misgivings. Id. at 142.
Hartwell modeled the above exercise on Stanley Milgram's experiments testing
obedience to authority. See S. MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AutHOmrry (1974). Adoption of
Milgram's methodology raises disquieting issues of deception and psychological harm
warranting elaboration. See H. KELMAN & V. HAMILTON, CRIMES OF OBEDIENC: TowARD
A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF AUiORITY AND REsPONSIBILITY 148-66 (1989); Dworkin, Must
Subjects Be Objects?, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN SOCIAL ScIENcE RESEARCH 246-54 (T. Beauchamp,
R. Faden, R. Wallace, L Walters eds. 1982) [hereinafter ETHICAL IssuES]; Elms, Keeping
Deception Honest: Justifying Conditionsfor Social Scientific Research Stratagems, in ETHICAL
ISSUES, supra, at 232-45; Macklin, The Problem of Adequate Disclosure in Social Science
Research, in ETHICAL IssuES, supra, at 193-214.

110. Compare Neumann,A PreliminayInquiyinto theArt of Critique,40
725 (1989).
111. Hartwell, supra note 5, at 144.
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overweening trust in clinical authorityU and thus fail to develop the
capacity for autonomous moral reasoning. As Hartwell points out, "[t]o
act ethically, students had to be able to defy an immediate figure of
authority in order to follow abstract rules."1"
To encourage student autonomy and faculty self-criticism" 4 in clinical
and professional responsibility settings, Hartwell mapped a curriculum
utilizing Robert J. Condlin's learning mode.lu Implementing this model
involved the recording and transcription of interviews, journal
commentary, and assertiveness training. The integration of these
activities
11 6
facilitated the translation of clinical skills into moral action.
Having secured this translation, Hartwell returns to theoretical
rumination on the wrong results of his clinical "Milgram" exercise. After
reviewing the composite strands of the exercise, he decides to reexamine
student interpretation of moral problems and execution of moral conduct.
The setting for this reexamination of moral advice and reasoning are
courses in Interviewing and Counseling, and Professional Responsibility." 7
Although Hartwell infuses both courses with Kolbergian theory,
Interviewing and Counseling is the more reliant. Differential reliance is
associated with the importance of matching and mismatching lawyer/client
moral stages of development in counseling. Hartwell contends that
effective counseling
demands the close matching of lawyer/client moral
118
reasoning.
In seeking to match lawyer/client moral criteria and guidelines,
Hartwell arguably stumbles back into interpretive privilege. Because he
does not pause to reconcile Kolbergian epistemology with alternative
categories of class, gender, and race-based knowledge," 9 his misstep risks

112. Hartwell observes: "As clinic instructors, we ask students to trust the legitimacy
of the skills we teach." Id at 146 (emphasis added).

113. Id at 144.
114. Hartwell confesses: "Whatever my good intentions, I was teaching a model of
domination and manipulation that was exactly counter to my intentions." Id at 149.
115. Id at 147-49. See, ,ag,Condlin, ClinicalEducation in the Seventies: An Appraisal
of the Decade,33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 604 (1983); Condlin, 'Tastes Grea Less Filling" The Law
School Clinic and Political Critique, 36 3. LEGAL EDUC. 45 (1986); Condlin, Socrates' New
Clothes: SubstitutingPersuasionfor Learningin ClinicalPracticeInstruction, 40 MD. L RaV.
223 (1981).

116.
117.
118.
119.

Hartwell, supra note 5, at 149-50.
Id at 151-54.
Id at 154-61.
For a discussion of alternative categories of knowledge, see C. GILLIGAN, IN A
DiFFERENT VOICH PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVEL PMENT (1982); C.
MACIQNNON, F-MINISM UNMODIIED: DISCOURsES ON LIE AND LAW (1987); Feminist
Discourse,Moral Values, and the Law -A Conversation, 34 BUFALwo L RExV. 11 (1985); On
In a Different Voice: An InterdisciplinaryForum,11 SIGNS: J.WOMEN CULTURE & Soc'Y 304
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the reproduction of lawyer/client hierarchy and the intrusion of lawyer
power. Hartwell's claim to ethical neutrality may come too late and fall
too weak to save his alternative paradigm from the "twin evils of
domination and manipulation" he so forcefully assails.'

VI. CONCLUSION
The works surveyed here represent a field of scholarship in diverse
and fruitful evolution. While the gradual emergence of alternative clinical
paradigms does not signal the overturning of dominant clinical practices,
their enlarged presence furnishes vigorous ideological competition. At
stake is the ongoing meaning of the clinical project.
It behooves us to join the interpretive contest over that meaning,
whether the contest is centered on client identity, neutral technique, and
right results or on additionally rich subjects of clinical pedagogy and
scholarship. Hesitation to engage in full-fledged debate carried out in
scholarship jeopardizes our collective right to define our place in the
academy.

(1986).
120. Id- at 161.

